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i APPELLATE CASE 
i NO: 9207500-CA 
i DISTRICT COURT CASE 
i NO: 910000459 
i PRIORITY: 15 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 (2) (i) , stating that the Court of Appeals 
has appellate jurisdiction over appeals from the District Court 
involving domestic relations cases, including but not limited to 
divorce and property division. Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure also indicates a procedure for taking appeals 
from judgments and orders of trial courts. This brief follows the 
structural requirements outlined in Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellant Procedure. This is a brief by Kaylene S. Smith, 
Plaintiff, in support of a judgment and Decree of Divorce entered 
below. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in making 
the award of alimony that it did. 
1 
2. Whether the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are 
sufficient to support the award of alimony. 
3. Whether the Court properly entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. 
4. Whether the Court erred in obligating Defendant to pay an 
income tax liability. 
5. Whether the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are 
sufficient to support the award of attorney fees. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL 
The Standard of Review on Appeal is that the trial court, in 
a divorce action, has considerable latitude of discretion in 
adjusting financial and property interests. Thus, the Appellate 
Court may reverse only if the appellant proves that there was a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in 
substantial and prejudicial error; or the evidence clearly 
preponderated against the findings; or such a serious inequity has 
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion, as set forth 
in English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
entered by the Honorable Clint S. Judkins sitting as a District 
2 
Court Judge on or about October 14, 1992. R. 68-78 (Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law). 
At trial, Plaintiff appeared and was represented by Attorney 
Jeff R. Thome. Defendant appeared and was represented by Attorney 
Brent E. Johns. A trial was held on the matter in which the only 
witnesses were plaintiff, defendant, and plaintiff's daughter. 
Judge Judkins entered his decision on the day of trial and 
Plaintiff's attorney prepared Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Decree of Divorce. T. 173-178 
Plaintiff's attorney prepared a Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce and forwarded same to 
defendant's attorney on or about September 24, 1992. R. 66 (Letter 
to Brent Johns dated September 24, 1992.) Defendant's attorney 
objected to paragraphs 10, 15, 16 and 17 of the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and paragraph 14 of the Decree of Divorce as 
set forth in his letter to plaintiff's attorney dated October 1, 
1992. R. 67 (Letter to Jeff Thome dated October 1, 1992.) 
Defendant's attorney withdrew as counsel on October 14, 1992. R. 84 
(Withdrawal of Counsel.) Plaintiff's attorney forwarded, together 
with a letter to the Court, the Decree of Divorce, Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law as well as Brent John's letter of October 1, 
1992. R. 65 (Letter to Judge Judkins dated October 5, 1992.) The 
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Decree and Findings were submitted to the Court together with a 
letter which indicated in part that it was being submitted for 
"either signing or modification as you see fit." R. (Letter to 
Judge Judkins dated October 5, 1992.) Judge Judkins made one 
change at paragraph 16 of the Findings of Fact, and signed the 
Decree of Divorce which was entered on October 14, 1992. R. 68-83 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Decree of Divorce.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant met in the summer of 1980 when 
plaintiff gained employment as a secretary at defendant's Grain 
Elevator operation. Both parties were married to other people at 
the time. (T. 11 and 12) Some time later, the relationship 
developed into a romantic relationship. (T. 12) Plaintiff obtained 
a divorce from her husband in 1983. The relationship continued 
until defendant was divorced. Defendant obtained a divorce from 
his wife in 1986. (T. 13 and 69) At that time, defendant assisted 
plaintiff in moving to Brigham City, Utah in January of 1986. (T. 
70) Defendant moved to Brigham City, Utah in June of 1986. (T. 70 
and 71) The parties maintained separate residences but continued 
their relationship until they were married on August 14, 1989. (T. 
17 and 73-74) 
Pursuant to his divorce from his former wife, defendant 
4 
received a settlement to compensate him for his interest in the 
family farm operation. It is disputed as to both the amount of 
settlement and as to how the amounts were arrived at. Defendant 
did not work during the time of the marriage. (T. 116) Plaintiff 
worked for Brigham Realty, Richard's Manufacturing Jewelers and 
Weinstocks while the parties resided in Brigham City. (T. 51-53) 
Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint, Order to Show Cause and 
Temporary Restraining Order on September 13, 1991. (R. 1-11) A 
trial was held on August 28, 1992, and the divorce entered on 
October 14, 1992. T. 68-78 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law) Defendant filed an appeal from this decision on November 12, 
1992. R. 85 and 86 (Notice of Appeal) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's Appeal is primarily centered around three issues, 
those being alimony, division of an income tax liability and 
attorney fees. The Court did not abuse its discretion in these 
areas, and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which 
were adequately supported by the evidence. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were appropriately 
entered, irrespective of the withdrawal of defendant's attorney 
after the trial had ended. 
With regard to alimony, the Court did not err in its award to 
5 
plaintiff. First, the Findings are adequate and are supported by 
the evidence at trial. Second, the Findings address the financial 
condition and needs of the plaintiff; the ability of plaintiff to 
produce an income for herself; and the ability of defendant to 
provide support. Finally, the Court properly excluded defendant's 
exhibits 4 and 5, under the Utah Rules of Evidence, Rules 402 and 
403. 
The Court did not err in requiring defendant to pay the income 
tax liability incurred as a result of the parties filing an amended 
and joint income tax return. 
The final issue defendant raises on appeal is attorney fees 
which were appropriately awarded on the basis that there was a 
showing of need on the part of the plaintiff for that award, and 
there was also a showing of the reasonableness of the fees. The 
trial court in this case entered findings which are supported by 
the actual evidence taken at trial. As such, the trial court's 
ruling should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ITS AWARD OF ALIMONY 
The Court should affirm the alimony award on the basis that 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered below are 
6 
sufficient to support the alimony award. 
A. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav are Sufficient to 
Support the Avard of Alimony. 
The trial court, in a divorce action, has considerable 
latitude of discretion in adjusting financial and property 
interests. A party appealing therefrom has the burden to prove 
there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting 
in substantial and prejudicial error; or the evidence clearly 
preponderated against the findings; or such a serious inequity has 
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. English v. 
English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977) (citing Baker v. Baker. 551 
P.2d 1263 (Utah 1976)). The trial court in this case did not abuse 
its discretion. The award of alimony in this action was consistent 
with the purposes of an alimony award as articulated by this Court. 
The Court has described the purpose of alimony: "The most 
important function of alimony is to provide support for the wife as 
nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during 
marriage, and to prevent the wife from becoming a public charge." 
English, 565 P.2d at 411. An alimony award should, to the extent 
possible, equalize the parties' respective post-divorce living 
standards and maintain them at a level as close as possible to that 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Rasband v. Rasband. 
7 
752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Gardner v. Gardnerf 
748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988); Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072, 
1075 (Utah 1985)). 
In this action the award fulfills the stated purpose of an 
alimony award. Prior to the parties7 marriage the plaintiff was 
working and earning a net income of approximately $1,000.00 per 
month. Plaintiff also was earning $1,000.00 per month during the 
marriage. The plaintiff terminated her employment, and is now only 
making approximately $400.00 per month in income. R. 73 (Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law) 
The Court found that the plaintiff has suffered an economic 
disadvantage as a result of the marriage in that she does not have 
as good as employment as she had before the marriage. R. 77 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) The Court then ordered 
defendant to pay alimony to the plaintiff in the amount of $643.00 
per month for a period of one year. Thereafter, defendant was 
ordered to pay alimony in the amount of $600.00 per month for the 
next two years. R. 77-78 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) 
The award of $600.00 per month alimony will allow plaintiff to 
maintain the standard of living she enjoyed prior to and during the 
marriage. The $400.00 per month income that the plaintiff is now 
earning, and the $600.00 per month alimony award will allow 
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plaintiff to approximate her accustomed standard of living. 
The alimony award will also serve to equalize the parties' 
respective post-divorce living standards. Defendant after paying 
the $600.00 per month will still be left with sufficient resources 
to maintain his standard of living. The record clearly indicates 
that defendant will have sufficient interest income and social 
security income to maintain himself in his accustomed standard of 
living. The record also tends to show that defendant received 
approximately $25,000.00 per year in rental income from a lease of 
three sections of property to his son. T. 232 and 236 
Defendant will earn a substantial amount of interest income 
from Smith Farms, Zions Bank, First Security Bank, and other 
sources. T. 135 As part of his written settlement agreement with 
his first wife, defendant was entitled to cash payments of 
$210,000.00 and $150,000.00. The $210,000.00 was to be paid 
$30,000.00 on or before April 20, 1986, $30,000.00 upon the closing 
of a loan, $150,000.00 payable in annual payments of $25,000.00 per 
year including interest at the rate of 8 percent. Additionally, 
defendant was to be paid by his former wife an additional 
$150,000.00 within five years from the date of the divorce. R. 70 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) Defendant will also earn 
interest on his account with American First Credit Union that had 
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a balance of $41,275.00 as of September 14, 1991, as well as on his 
share savings account that had a balance of $9,532.16. R. 70 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) 
Defendant also had five different certificates of deposit with 
First Security Bank in Challis, Idaho. The money was deposited on 
March 27, 1991, each account had an initial deposit of $36,000.00, 
and accrued interest at the rate of 6.83% per annum. These 
accounts totalled $180,000.00 on March 17, 1992. R. 71 (Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law) 
Defendant also received the sum of $249,120.93, on or about 
March 27, 1991, for his share of any interest in the farm 
properties he was awarded under his prior divorce decree. 
Defendant is unable to state whether the money constituted earnings 
off the farm property or whether it was all principal and interest 
from the sale of the property. R. 71 (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law) Regardless of the source of the money, in the 
future defendant will be able to earn substantial income in the 
form of interest from this sum. 
Defendant is also eligible for social security. Defendant 
stated that he would be entitled to approximately $350.00 per 
month. 
Defendant cannot be heard to claim that he has no income with 
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which to pay the alimony award. Just because defendant is 
unemployed and therefore earns no income from wages, this does not 
mean that defendant has no income. In fact as set out above, 
defendant has substantial income from interest earnings as well as 
his entitlement to social security. Defendant is entitled to 
$350.00 per month in social security for a total of $4,200 per 
year, and defendant receives $10,000.00 - $12,000.00 per year in 
interest income. T. 275 Defendant clearly will be able to maintain 
his standard of living after paying the alimony award. 
The award will also serve to equalize the parties7 respective 
post-divorce living standards. At plaintiff's current income level 
she is earning only $4,800.00 per year. Without the alimony, there 
would be a great disparity between plaintiff's and defendant's 
respective standards of living. Thus, the award of alimony is 
necessary to partially equalize the disparity in the parties' post-
divorce standards of living. 
As the Court has stated, this court will not disturb the trial 
court's award of spousal support absent a showing of a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion. Rasband, 752 P.2d at 1333 (citing 
Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986). As set out above, 
the alimony award in this action serves the very purpose of alimony 
in allowing plaintiff to maintain her standard of living, and 
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equalizing the parties' post-divorce living standards. Thus, the 
trial court clearly did not abuse its discretion. 
The Court in Jones. 700 P. 2d at 1075, articulated three 
factors that must be considered in fixing a reasonable alimony 
award: 1. the financial conditions and needs of the wife; 2. the 
ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for herself; and 
3. the ability of the husband to provide support. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this action 
address the three factors set out above. 
First, the financial condition and needs of the plaintiff are 
addressed in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The 
plaintiff has suffered an economic disadvantage as a result of the 
marriage in that she does not have as good as employment as she had 
before the marriage and during the marriage before she quit her 
employment due, at least in part, to the urging of the defendant. 
R. 77 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) The plaintiff is 
currently employed and earning approximately $400.00 per month. 
This is compared with the $1,000.00 per month plaintiff was earning 
before and during part of the marriage. R. 73 (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law) The plaintiff needs an income on an average 
monthly basis of $1,162.00 to enable her to live similar to how she 
lived during the marriage, and to meet her current living expenses 
12 
and obligations. R. 73 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) 
Thus plaintiff is in need of approximately $762.00 per month to 
maintain her standard of living. 
Second, the ability of plaintiff to produce a sufficient 
income for herself is also stated in the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. As set out under the first factor, plaintiff's 
current income is only $400.00 per month. R. 73 (Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law) Plaintiff has not been able to find 
employment that will produce sufficient income for her to support 
herself. 
Plaintiff was employed at a job with Weinstocks that would 
have allowed her to support herself. However, defendant and 
plaintiff came to a mutual agreement that plaintiff should leave 
that job. T. 211, 212, and 252 The transcript reveals evidence of 
defendant's displeasure with plaintiff's job, and his feelings that 
plaintiff should leave the job. Plaintiff stated that defendant 
did not want her to work, rather defendant wanted plaintiff to stay 
home with him. T. 128 and 159 The job at Weinstocks was hard on 
the marriage since plaintiff often had to work from 4:00 to 5:00 
p.m. until midnight. T. 161 and 163 Defendant did not believe the 
job was worth the expense, and the wear and tear on their car. T. 
163, 208, 211, and 212 Defendant also felt that plaintiff's safety 
13 
was at risk working at the job at Weinstocks. Defendant stated 
that he had heard that cars had been broken into and people had 
been mugged in the parking lot at plaintiff's employment. T. 208 
and 209 Plaintiff agreed with defendant's concerns and left her 
job. Thus, defendant's urging led plaintiff to give up the job 
that would have allowed her to come closer to supporting herself. 
Plaintiff's future ability to produce sufficient income for 
herself has also been brought into question by her present medical 
condition. That plaintiff is in need of surgery was established in 
evidence pursuant to a letter from Dr. C. M. Dibble. Plaintiff's 
condition requiring this surgery arose during the marriage. R. 73 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) Plaintiff does not have 
enough money for the surgery, and it is not clear whether or not 
she will be physically capable of full-time work until she has had 
the surgery. T. 132 
Third, the ability of the defendant to provide support has 
also been shown. Although defendant was unable or unwilling to 
explain his present financial condition, certain facts may be 
extracted from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and from 
the transcript. As part of the settlement agreement with 
defendant's first wife, he was entitled to cash payments of 
$210,000.00 and $150,000.00. The $210,000.00 was to be paid 
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$30,000.00 on or before April 20, 1986, $30,000.00 upon the closing 
of a loan, $150,000.00 payable in annual payments of $25,000.00 per 
year including interest at the rate of 8% per annum. Defendant was 
also to receive an additional $150,000.00 within five years from 
the date of the divorce. R. 70 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law) Defendant also had an account with American First Credit 
Union with a balance of $41,275.00, and a share savings account in 
the amount of $9,532.16. Defendant also had five different 
certificates of deposit with First Security Bank in Challis, Idaho. 
Each account had an initial deposit of $36,000.00 and accrued 
interest at the rate of 6.83% per annum. The accounts totalled 
$180,000.00 on March 17, 1992. R. 70 and 71 (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law) 
Defendant also received $249,120.93 on or about March 27, 
1991, for his share of any interest in the farm properties he was 
awarded under his prior divorce decree. Defendant was unable to 
articulate how the amount of money was computed. Defendant was 
also unable to articulate whether the money constituted earnings 
off the farm property which he held in common with his ex-wife, or 
whether it was all principal and interest from the sale of the 
property. R. 71 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) 
Defendant is also eligible for social security of 
15 
approximately $350.00 per month. 
Although the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law address 
the defendant's ability to provide support, the Court must also 
consider the transcript from this action. The Court need only 
make a cursory review of the transcript, especially the cross-
examination of defendant, to understand the difficulty in 
determining defendant's financial condition. Defendant was 
clearly unable or unwilling to disclose his financial condition; 
however, certain facts may be clearly drawn from the transcript. 
It is clear that defendant will earn a substantial amount of 
interest income from Smith Farms, Zions Bank, First Security Bank, 
and other sources. T. 135 Defendant made over $17,480.72 in 
interest income in a two year period during the marriage. 
Defendant reported this interest income as joint income on his tax 
returns over the two years. T. 247 and 248 
In considering defendant's entire financial position it 
appears that defendant earns $350.00 per month from social 
security, and $10,000.00 - $12,000.00 per year in interest income. 
T. 275 Defendant also stated that he received approximately 
$25,000.00 per year in rental income from a lease of three sections 
of farming property. T. 232 and 236 Despite defendant's inability 
or unwillingness to completely outline his financial condition, 
16 
taking the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the evidence 
from the transcript as a whole, it appears clear that defendant has 
the ability to provide support. 
The Court has stated that [i]f these three factors have been 
considered, we will not disturb the trial court's alimony award 
unless such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion. Rappleye v. Rappleye, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 
47 (Utah App. 1993) (citing Morgan v. Morgan. 213 Utah Adv. Rep. 
22, 26 (Utah App. 1993)) (quoting Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 
84, 90 (Utah App. 1989)) (citation omitted). No serious inequity 
has resulted in this case. Plaintiff has been placed in a 
position, due to the alimony award, where she may be able to 
maintain the standard of living she enjoyed prior to the marriage. 
The trial court considered the three factors, as set out above, and 
did not abuse its discretion. Thus, this Court should not disturb 
the trial court's alimony award. 
B. The Court Did Not Err in Entering the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
The trial court asked plaintiff's attorney to prepare the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and send them to opposing 
counsel for approval, and then to see that they were submitted to 
the court. T. 284 Plaintiff's attorney prepared the Findings and 
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Conclusions and forwarded them to defendant's attorney, on 
September 24, 1992. R. 66 Defendant's attorney replied by a letter 
dated October 1, 1992, indicating that he disagreed in part with 
the Findings at paragraph 10, 15, 16, and 17 and paragraph 14 of 
the Decree of Divorce, R. 67 (Letter to Jeff Thorne dated October 
1, 1992) Plaintiff's attorney submitted the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law to the court with a letter to Judge Judkins 
dated October 5, 1992. The letter informed the court of 
plaintiff's and defendant's differences as to the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, and asked the court to modify the documents 
as the court saw fit. R. 65 (Letter to Judge Judkins dated October 
5, 1992) The court was able to review plaintiff's and defendant's 
positions and it in fact made a change to plaintiff's documents, 
before issuing its final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Decree of Divorce. 
No violation of Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration occurred. In fact, defendant has not set out any 
alleged violations in his brief. Defendant cannot request that his 
attorney withdraw from the case and then subsequently protest that 
the attorney, who he requested to withdraw, should have proceeded 
to object to the Findings and Decree of Divorce. Defendant 
obviously was unhappy with the court's decision; however, he cannot 
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use his own request to his attorney to withdraw as a basis to have 
the decision he disagreed with set aside on appeal. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are not against 
the weight of the evidence, and were not improperly entered under 
Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. 
C The Court Did Not Err in Its Exclusion of Certain Evidence 
Defendant's attorney attempted to admit into evidence, a 
letter marked Defendant's exhibit #4, which was a letter to 
plaintiff's girlfriend in Idaho dated January 7, 1990. Defendant 
testified that he found the letter in the garbage where it was torn 
up and that he pieced it together. Defendant's attorney also 
attempted to admit exhibit #5, another letter from plaintiff to her 
parents, dated January 5, 1990, into evidence. This letter was 
also found in the trash where it had been torn up and was also 
pieced back together by defendant. Neither exhibit 4 nor exhibit 
5 was admitted into evidence. 
The trial court questioned the materiality of the letters. T. 
203 Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 402 provides: 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise 
provided by the Constitution of the United States or the 
Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these 
rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this 
state. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
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The court sustained plaintiff's objection, to the admissibility of 
the letters, stating that it felt that had the letters been 
delivered there would be a question as to their materiality; 
however, since plaintiff had torn up and thrown away the letters, 
they were clearly not material. T. 204 The court stated that it 
would sustain plaintiff's objection unless defendant could offer 
anything else to substantiate his claims that the letters should be 
admitted. T. 204 Defendant's attorney did not offer any other 
arguments or grounds for the letters' admissibility, but rather 
moved on to another issue. 
As provided in Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 403: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
The court clearly questioned the relevancy of the letters. Even if 
there was a possibility that the letters had some minimal 
relevancy, the trial court was clearly acting within its proper 
bounds of discretion in excluding the evidence under Rule 403. 
Clearly these letters addressed collateral matters which were not 
central to the divorce proceedings. The trial court properly used 
its discretion in excluding the exhibits. 
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The law is clear that in matters of determining materiality 
the trial court should be accorded a large measure of discretion 
and should only be reversed if this discretion is abused. Martin v. 
Safewav Stores. Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1141 (Utah 1977). 
In In the Interest of R.R.D.. 791 P.2d 206 (Utah App. 1990), 
a case where the issue was whether a juvenile should be treated as 
an adult, the trial court excluded a comparison of records of other 
youths within the Youth Corrections. The juvenile appealed the 
exclusion arguing that the evidence excluded would show that the 
average youth in secure confinement had committed more offenses 
than R.R.D. This Court upheld the lower court's exclusion of the 
evidence, The Court stated that trial courts are given great 
discretion to determine the relevance and weight of submitted 
evidence because of their competence in judging the exigencies of 
a particular case. Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst.. 605 P.2d 
314, 322-23 (Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds, McFarland v. 
Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984). Consequently, a 
court's determination in this regard will not be reversed unless it 
is shown that there was an abuse of that discretion. Terry, 605 
P.2d at 323; In the Interest of R.R.D. . 791 P.2d at 212. Clearly, 
in this case the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
excluding the exhibits. 
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D. The Court Did Not Err in Awarding Alimony, and Did Not 
Improperly Award to Plaintiff, Defendant's Premarital Assets. 
The trial court made findings as to defendant's sources of 
income and the record is replete with testimony regarding 
defendant's income. Therefore, defendant's argument that the 
alimony must be paid out of premarital assets is not founded on the 
evidence in the record. As has been previously set forth, 
defendant earns $350.00 per month in social security and $10,000.00 
- $12,000.00 per year in interest income. T. 275 Defendant has 
also stated that he received approximately $25,000.00 per year in 
rental income from a lease of three sections of farming property. 
T. 232 and 236 In addition, during the marriage defendant received 
$249,120.93 for his share of any interest he held in farm property. 
Defendant was unable or unwilling to articulate whether this 
payment constituted earnings off of the farm property. R. 71 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) As further evidence of 
defendant's income potential, it should be noted that defendant 
reported over $17,480.72 as joint income on his tax returns during 
the two years of the marriage. T. 247 and 248 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the record 
clearly show that defendant has a substantial stream of income from 
which to pay the alimony award, and that the alimony is not being 
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paid out of defendant's premarital assets. Thus, the trial court's 
award of alimony was proper and not an abuse of discretion. 
Even if this Court determined that the alimony is being paid 
out of premarital assets, the trial court's award of alimony is 
still proper and not an abuse of discretion. Utah Code Ann. § 30-
3-5 (1) (1989) provides in part that "[w]hen a decree of divorce is 
entered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to 
the children, property, and parties ..." The Utah Supreme Court 
has concluded that this statute confers "broad discretion upon 
trial courts in the division of property, regardless of its source 
or time of acquisition." Walters v. Walters. 812 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 
App. 1991) (quoting Burke v. Burke. 733 P.2d 133, 134-35 (Utah 
1987)). Further, "the purpose of property divisions is to allocate 
property in the manner which best serves the needs of the parties 
and best permits them to pursue their separate lives." Noble v. 
Noble. 761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988) (quoting Burke. 733 P.2d at 
135) . 
The general rule is that premarital property is viewed as 
separate property. However, this rule is not invariable. "In 
fashioning an equitable property division, trial courts need 
consider all of the pertinent circumstances." Burke, 733 P.2d at 
135. In Walters 812 P.2d at 67, the court set out several factors 
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to be considered: 
the amount and kind of property to be divided; whether 
the property was acquired before or during the marriage; 
the source of the property; the health of the parties; 
the parties' standard of living, respective financial 
conditions, needs, and earning capacity; the duration of 
the marriage; the children of the marriage; the parties' 
ages at the time of marriage and of divorce; what the 
parties gave up by the marriage; and the necessary 
relationship the property division has with the amount of 
alimony and child support to be awarded. 
Where unique circumstances exist, a trial court may reallocate 
premarital property as part of property division incident to 
divorce. Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 424-25 (Utah App. 1990). 
Several of the factors listed are of importance in this case. 
In considering the amount and kind of property to be divided, it is 
clear that defendant received a substantial amount of interest 
income and rental income during the course of the marriage. 
Defendant is also eligible for social security income. 
The plaintiff's health is also an important issue in this 
case. The trial court entered a specific finding as to plaintiff's 
need for surgery, and that the condition arose during the marriage. 
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R. 73 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) 
The parties' standard of living, respective financial 
conditions, needs, and earning capacities have also been addressed 
at length under POINT I. A.. It is clear that without the award of 
alimony, plaintiff's standard of living will be dramatically 
reduced; whereas, the defendant would be able to maintain his 
standard of living while paying the alimony award. The financial 
condition, needs, and earning capacity of plaintiff have also been 
established. Plaintiff's ability to produce income is 
approximately $762.00 per month less than the amount she needs to 
live on. Defendant's financial condition is substantially stronger 
than plaintiff's, and he will easily be able to cover his needs and 
pay the award of alimony to plaintiff. 
The relationship between the property division and the amount 
of alimony is also an important factor in this action. There is a 
vast disparity between the amount of property awarded to plaintiff 
and that awarded to defendant. Plaintiff cannot use the minimal 
amount of property she was awarded to sustain herself; whereas, 
defendant will be able to live in relative ease and comfort from 
the property he was awarded. Also if this Court allows defendant 
to deny that he earns a substantial amount of income from social 
security, interest, and rent; then defendant will be able to live 
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in relative ease from his substantial assets, while pleading 
poverty and no income when faced with the prospect of having to pay 
alimony. The alimony award is necessary for plaintiff to maintain 
her standard of living given her paucity of assets. If this Court 
determines that defendant has no income, then an award to plaintiff 
of defendant's premarital assets is the only just resolution of 
this issue. Without the alimony award plaintiff would leave the 
marriage with very few assets and no money, and without the ability 
to maintain her standard of living. 
As the court stated in Noble, 761 P.2d at 1373, there is no 
per se ban on awarding one spouse a portion of the premarital 
assets of another... under appropriate circumstances, achieving a 
fair, just, and equitable result may require that the trial court 
exercise its discretion to award one spouse the premarital property 
of another. In this action plaintiff was awarded only minimal 
assets and the alimony award is the only means plaintiff has to 
maintain her standard of living. The trial court properly viewed 
this relationship between the property division and the award of 
alimony in this action. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 
1279 n.l (Utah 1987), explained that the issues of alimony and 
property division are not entirely separable. 
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[N]either the trial court nor this Court considers the 
property division in a vacuum. The amount of alimony 
awarded and the relative earning capabilities of the 
parties are also relevant, because the relative abilities 
of the spouses to support themselves after the divorce 
are pertinent to an equitable determination of the 
division of the fixed assets of the marriage. 
If this Court allows defendant to characterize his social security, 
interest, and rental income as premarital property, then an 
equitable division of his "premarital" property would be just and 
proper given the relative earning capabilities of the parties and 
the needs of the plaintiff. 
The court, in Noble, was faced with a situation where the 
wife, Elaine, had been awarded by the trial court a substantial 
portion of the husband's, Glen's, premarital property because of 
the husband's inability to provide sufficient alimony. Glen 
appealed the award of the premarital property to Elaine. The court 
stated that, "[t]he gross inadequacy of the alimony available to 
provide for Elaine's needs, the paucity of her separate premarital 
property, and Glen's relative wealth all warranted Judge Tibb's 
awarding Elaine a substantial portion of Glen's premarital 
property. Noble, 761 P.2d at 1373. 
If this Court allows defendant to classify all of his income 
as premarital assets, then this action presents a situation similar 
to that presented in Noble. Defendant would then be in a position 
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to claim an inability to provide alimony for plaintiff's needs; 
plaintiff has very few premarital assets; and defendant is in a 
position of relative wealth. The difference in this action is that 
plaintiff would only be awarded a small portion of defendant's 
premarital property in the form of alimony as compared to the 
substantial portion of premarital property awarded in Noble. 
Therefore, the alimony award in this action is proper either 
as an award out of defendant's income, or as a just and equitable 
award of a small portion of defendant's premarital assets. The 
trial court in this action did not abuse its discretion and the 
award of alimony to the plaintiff should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ORDERING DEFENDANT TO PAY THE 
INCOME TAX LIABILITY 
The trial court acted within its proper discretion in ordering 
that defendant pay the income tax liability. R. 76 (Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law) Plaintiff received a notice from the 
state tax commission stating that there were some back taxes due to 
the state. T. 133 This liability resulted when plaintiff amended 
her tax return upon defendant's request. Plaintiff had filed 
married separate, and defendant informed plaintiff that he would 
save money if plaintiff would amend her return and file jointly. T. 
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170 Defendant convinced plaintiff to switch her filing status, and 
assured her that he would pay any balance due as a result of the 
revision in her filing status. T. 133, 134, 170, and 216. 
Plaintiff complied with her part of the agreement by amending 
her return. Now defendant asks the Court to allow him to back out 
of his part of their agreement by setting aside the trial court's 
order that he pay the tax liability. In Rasband, 752 P.2d at 1335, 
this Court stated that [t]he trial court in a divorce action has 
considerable discretion in equitably adjusting the financial and 
property interests of the parties. Argyle v. Argyle. 688 P.2d 468, 
470 (Utah 1984); Lee v. Lee. 744 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Utah App. 1987). 
Because the court's distribution of property is endowed with a 
presumption of validity, Pusev v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah 
1986), we will not disturb it on appeal unless it is clearly unjust 
or a clear abuse of discretion. Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076, 
1078 (Utah 1988); Smith v. Smith. 78 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Ct. App. 
1988). 
The trial court in this case has not abused its discretion, 
and it is clearly not unjust for the court to insist that defendant 
live up to his end of the agreement he made with plaintiff. 
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POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ORDERING DEFENDANT TO PAY ATTORNEY 
FEES. 
A. Plaintiff was Entitled to Attorney Fees in the Divorce Action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1989) gives trial courts the power to 
award attorney fees in divorce actions. Morgan v. Morgan. 213 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 22, 27 (Utah App. 1993). Both the decision to award 
attorney fees, and the amount of such fees, are within the sound 
discretion of the court. Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P. 2d 836, 840 (Utah 
App. 1991). The award must be based on evidence of both financial 
need and reasonableness. Rasband, 752 P. 2d at 1336 (citing Beals v. 
Beals, 682 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1984)). 
Reasonable attorney fees are not measured by what an attorney 
actually bills, nor is the number of hours spent on the case 
determinative in computing fees. In determining the reasonableness 
of attorney fees, ... a court may consider among other factors, the 
difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in 
presenting the case, the reasonableness of the number of hours 
spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality for 
similar services, the amount involved in the case, and the result 
attained, and the expertise and experience of the attorneys 
involved. Rasband. 752 P.2d at 1336 (quoting Cabrera v. Cottrell, 
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694 P.2d 622, 624-25 (Utah 1985)). 
The attorney fees in this action were reasonable considering 
this action in light of the factors set out above. Plaint if f's 
attorney stated that he charges $100.00 per hour, which he believes 
to be a reasonable fee. T. 172 Defendant's attorney stipulated as 
to the reasonableness of the $100.00 per hour fee. T. 172 and 276 
The Court, after reviewing the transcript, will clearly find that 
this has been a difficult action. Plaintiff's attorney has had to 
conduct discovery, and has had to take defendant's deposition in 
order to obtain evidence of defendant's financial condition. T. 172 
Defendant did not furnish any of the documents requested in 
discovery, and could not explain where his money came from during 
his deposition. T. 267 
As the transcript demonstrates, plaintiff's attorney has had 
difficulty in sifting through the facts and cashflows of the 
defendant. T. 263 This difficulty was caused in large part by the 
inability or unwillingness of defendant to cooperate in detailing 
his financial condition. Defendant's attorney admitted to the 
difficulty of the case, especially in knowing where the cash came 
from. T. 269 
Plaintiff's attorney also stated that this action had taken 35 
hours to prepare, in addition to the time of the trial and the time 
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to prepare the Findings. Plaintiff's attorney also spent time on 
discovery and taking defendant's deposition. T. 172 Defendant's 
attorney, after admitting to the difficulty of the case, later 
stated that he believed that 20 hours was a reasonable amount of 
time. T. 276 Defendant's attorney had already admitted that $100 
per hour was reasonable. T. 276 Thus, in the estimation of 
defendant's attorney a reasonable fee would be $2000.00. This is 
exactly what the trial court awarded in attorney fees; therefore, 
defendant should not now be heard to complain about the award of 
$2000.00 in attorney fees. 
In fact it may be argued that the trial court's award was in 
error because plaintiff's attorney requested $3500.00 in attorney 
fees. The trial court lowered the award of attorney fees to the 
amount stipulated to by defendant's attorney as reasonable, without 
any statement as to why it had reduced the award. 
The Court has stated that "[t]he court abuses its discretion 
in awarding less than the amount [of attorney fees] requested 
unless the reduction is warranted" by one or more of the above 
factors. The trial court must, accordingly, identify such factors 
on the record and also explain its sua sponte reduction in order to 
permit meaningful review on appeal. Haumont, 793 P.2d at 426, 
(quoting Martindale v. Adams. 777 P.2d 514, 518 (Utah App. 1989)). 
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The trial court did not identify any factors on the record that 
would warrant a reduction in the attorney fees requested by 
plaintiff. Defendant certainly should not now be heard to question 
the award of $2000.00 in attorney fees given the stipulation by 
defendant's attorney. 
The Court has further stated that the award must be based on 
evidence of the financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability 
of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested 
fees. Rasband, 752 P. 2d at 1337. The Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law have clearly shown that plaintiff lacks the 
ability to pay the fees. Plaintiff is only making approximately 
$4 00.00 per month in income. R. 73 (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law) If plaintiff were to bear the expense of 
attorney fees, it would require five months of her earnings for her 
to pay the fees leaving her without any funds to live on for those 
five months. 
As to defendant's ability to pay the fees, defendant's 
financial condition has been clearly and exhaustively detailed in 
POINT I. of this argument. Defendant's income of $350.00 per month 
from social security, his $10,000.00 - $12,000.00 per year in 
interest income, and his $25,000.00 per year in rental income from 
the three sections of his farming property put defendant in a far 
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better position to bear the attorney fees in this action. T. 232, 
236, and 275. 
Thus in considering the reasonableness of the attorney fees, 
the financial need of the plaintiff, and the ability of defendant 
to pay, it is clear that the trial court's award was proper and 
within its discretion. 
B. Plaintiff is Entitled to Attorney Fees on This Appeal. 
The Court has stated that " [o]rdinarily, when fees in a 
divorce were awarded below to the party who then prevails on 
appeal, fees will also be awarded to that party on appeal." Bell v. 
Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Burt v. Burt, 799 
P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah App. 1990)). 
Thus, if the Court affirms the trial court's decision, 
plaintiff should be entitled to her attorney fees which she has 
incurred in opposing this appeal. The attorney fees incurred on 
this appeal should be remanded for a hearing at the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding 
alimony to the plaintiff. The court properly considered the 
financial condition and needs of the plaintiff, the ability of the 
plaintiff to produce an income for herself, and the ability of the 
defendant to provide support. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
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of Law are adequate to support the trial court's award. 
The trial court's ruling in regard to the income tax liability 
was proper and within the proper scope of the courts discretion. 
The tax liability was incurred to benefit defendant, and he 
promised plaintiff that he would pay any tax liability that arose. 
Defendant should be obligated to live up to the agreement he had 
with the plaintiff; therefore, the trial court's ruling was proper. 
Finally, the trial court did not err in awarding plaintiff 
attorney fees. Sufficient facts were entered with regard to 
plaintiff's need, defendant's ability to pay, and as to the 
reasonableness of the fees. Plaintiff should also be entitled to 
an award of the attorney fees which she was forced to incur in 
seeking to have the trial court's ruling upheld. Plaintiff asks 
this Court to remand to the trial court for an award of attorney 
fees on appeal. Based upon these reasons this Court should affirm 
the trial court's ruling, and remand for attorney fees on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / o day of September, 1993. 
Je^giK 
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. All references are to the pages of the original record as 
paginated by the Clerk of the District Court, pursuant to the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 25 (e). All documents in the 
record referred to will be found in the Appendix in the order 
referred to in the Brief. For purpose of clarity, the following 
abbreviations shall be adopted by Appellee: 
"R." refers to the record with its page number and title of 
the document in parenthesis. 
"T." refers to the transcript. 
pj/3:appeal.jhb 
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ADDENDUM A 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Jeff R. Thorne of Mann, Hadfield & Thorne #3250 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Zions Bank Building - 98 North Main 
P. O. Box 876 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876 
Telephone: 723-3404 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KAYLENE S. SMITH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
ODELL M. SMITH, JR., ] 
Defendant. ] 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. 910000459DA 
1 Judge Clint S. Judkins 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 28th 
day of August, 1992 at the hour of 10:00 o'clock a.m. The 
plaintiff was personally present and was represented by her 
counsel of record, Jeff R. Thorne of the firm of Mann, Hadfield 
and Thorne. The defendant was present and was represented by his 
counsel, Brent E. Johns. The plaintiff introduced her evidence 
and testified in said matter; and the defendant introduced his 
evidence and testified in said matter. The court being fully 
familiar in the premises issues the following Findings of Fact. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. RELATIONSHIP PRIOR TO MARRIAGE 
The parties have had a romantic relationship beginning in 1980. 
From 1986 and continuing up to the date the parties were married 
(OCT 14 199^ 
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on August 14, 1989 at Challis, Idaho the parties spent the 
majority of each week living together. Even though the parties 
had an intimate relationship, the parties did not represent 
themselves to be husband and wife to their friends or to their 
family. It was commonly recognized by plaintiff's family that 
they were "living together" the majority of time from 1986 to the 
time they were married. The parties relationship contributed to 
each party's divorce from their prior spouses. 
DATE OF MARRIAGE 
2. The plaintiff and defendant were married on August 14, 
1989 at Challis, Idaho. 
NO CHILDREN 
3. No children have been born as issue of said marriage 
and none are expected. 
RESIDENCE OF PARTIES 
4. The plaintiff and the defendant are residents of Box 
Elder County, State of Utah, and have been for more than three 
months immediately prior to the commencement of this action. 
GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE 
5. During the course of the marriage and the months 
preceding the filing of the action, irreconcilable differences 
developed such that the very purposes of the marriage were 
destroyed. 
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DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY FROM PRIOR MARRIAGE 
6. Odell Smith was divorced from his former wife, Renae 
Smith in March, 1986 in the State of Idaho. As part of his 
written settlement agreement with his first wife, Odell Smith was 
entitled to cash payments of $210,000.00 and $150,000.00. The 
prior divorce decree provided that the $210,000.00 was to be paid 
$30,000.00 on or before April 20, 1986, $30,000.00 upon the 
closing of a loan (the terms of the loan were mentioned in the 
decree), $150,000,000 payable in annual payments of $25,000.00 
per year including interest at the rate of eight percent annum 
from the date of March 27, 1986. Additionally, Mr. Smith was to 
be paid by his former wife an additional $150,000.00 within five 
years from the date of the divorce. The payments were to 
compensate Mr. Smith for his share of the marital assets in his 
first marriage. Mr. Smith, also, received other assets under his 
prior divorce. 
ASSETS IN BANKS AT TIME OF THE DIVORCE 
7. At the time the divorce action was filed, there was in 
an account in the name of Odell M. Smith with American First 
Credit Union a balance of $41,275.00 as of September 14, 1991, 
together with a share savings account in the amount of $9,532.16. 
Mr. Smith testified at one time Kaylenefs name was on his 
checking account, but he removed it because "she spent too much." 
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Odell Smith also had five different certificates of deposit with 
First Security Bank in Challis, Idaho. The money was deposited 
on March 27, 1991, each account had initial deposit of $36,000.00 
and which accrued interest at the rate of 6.83% per annum. These 
accounts totalled $180,000.00 on March 17, 1992. Mr. Smith 
testified the money for these accounts came from payments from 
his first wife. 
CHALLI8 PROPERTY 
8. Odell Smith also received a cabin and real property in 
Challis, Idaho, which came from his divorce settlement with his 
first wife. 
$249,120.93 PAYMENT RECEIVED DURING THIS MARRIAGE 
9. Odell Smith received the sum of $249,120.93 on or about 
March 27, 1991 from his former wife and/or son for his share of 
any interest in the farm properties he was awarded under his 
prior divorce decree. Mr. Smith was unable to articulate how the 
amount of money was computed. He was unable to state whether 
the money constituted earnings off the farm property which he 
held in common with his ex-wife or whether it was all principal 
or interest from the sale of the property. 
HOME PURCHASED IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO MARRIAGE 
10. A home was purchased at 70 North 200 East, Brigham 
City, Utah on June 27, 1989, approximately six weeks prior to the 
time the parties were married. Title to the home was only in Mr. 
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Smith's name. The home was purchased with Mrs. Smith's consent 
and knowledge and was the marital home of the parties. The 
parties stipulated that the home had a market value of 
$63,000.00, and there exists a lien against the home in the 
approximate amount of $29,000,00. A $25,000.00 down payment was 
made by the defendant out of his separate funds. The court 
determines that there is a $9,000.00 equity in the family home. 
AUTOMOBILE PURCHASED DURING MARRIAGE 
11. In July, 1991 a 1991 Dodge Shadow automobile was 
purchased, which has a fair market value of $7,000.00. The 
automobile was purchased with funds from the checking account 
with America First Credit Union account. 
LOT AND STORAGE PURCHASED IN 1986 
12. The defendant purchased a lot and storage building in 
1986 in Brigham City, Utah. The lot and building has a fair 
market value of $18,500.00. This real estate was titled in Mr. 
Smith's name. 
PERSONAL PROPERTY BEFORE MARRIAGE 
13. The plaintiff had a table and four chairs, a roll-top 
desk, a couch, a green rocker, a square end table, a bathroom 
bench, and a green hanging lamp, which was her property before 
the marriage which was taken to the cabin in Challis, Idaho after 
the parties were married. 
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PROPERTY ACQUIRED DURING MARRIAGE 
14. During the marriage, the parties purchased a three-
piece white leather furniture set, two area rugs, a grandfather 
clock, a toaster, various wall hangings, a silk flower 
arrangement, and vacuum. 
MEDICAL NEEDS OF PLAINTIFF 
15. The plaintiff is in need of surgery pursuant to a 
letter of Dr. C. M. Dibble, M.D. which was admitted into 
evidence. Plaintifffs medical condition requiring surgery arose 
during this marriage. 
EMPLOYMENT OF PLAINTIFF 
16. Prior to the parties' marriage, the plaintiff was 
working and earning net income of approximately $1,000.00 per 
month. Plaintiff also was earning $1,000.00 during this f M K ^ 
marriage. The plaintiff terminated her employment because of th< 
w^ skufl and dCLiliLb uf the deftSH35j¥fc and plaintiff is now only 
making approximately $400.00 income per month. 
LIVING EXPENSES OF PLAINTIFF 
17. The plaintiff needs income on an average monthly basis 
of $1,162.00 to enable her to live similar to how she lived 
during the marriage and to meet her current living expenses and 
obligations. 
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SOCIAL SECURITY AVAILABILITY TO DEFENDANT 
18. The defendant is eligible for social security, but has 
not applied for social security at the present time. The 
defendant states that he would be entitled to social security of 
approximately $350.00 per month. The defendant has not been 
employed during the time the parties have been married. 
DEBTS 
19. The only debts are the debt existing against the home 
in Brigham City, Utah. 
AS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FROM THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT 
THE COURT CONCLUDES: 
MARRIAGE PROPERTY 
1. The only joint property the parties have acquired 
during the time of the marriage is the equity in the home which 
was purchased. The court sets the equity at $9,000.00. The 
defendant shall pay to the plaintiff $4,500.00 within 60 days as 
and for her share of the equity. 
AUTOMOBILE 
2. The 1991 Dodge automobile was purchased with the 
defendant's separate funds. The automobile will be awarded to 
the defendant. 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
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3. The plaintiff shall be awarded the loveseat, chair and 
vacuum. The defendant shall receive the remainder of the items 
acquired during the marriage. 
PERSONAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED PRIOR TO MARRIAGE 
4. The plaintiff shall be entitled to the items of 
property which were taken to the cabin in Challis, Idaho which 
were hers prior to the time the parties married. Those items of 
property are the table and four chairs, roll-top desk, couch, 
green rocker, square end table, bathroom bench, and green hanging 
lamp. The defendant shall return those items to plaintiff within 
10 days. 
MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS 
5. The defendant shall be awarded the Bible, the carved 
Bible stand, the Revere Ware, the five quart pan with lilac 
handles, the pressure cooker, the knife block and paring knives, 
as well as any of his cassette tapes which may be in plaintiff's 
possession. All other items of personal property which plaintiff 
has in her possession shall remain hers and shall be her sole and 
separate property. 
PLAINTIFF'S UNINSURED MEDICAL EXPENSES 
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6. The defendant shall pay any medical expenses related to 
plaintiff's surgery not covered by insurance, if those expenses 
are incurred within the next six (6) months. 
LOT AND STORAGE SHED 
7. The court finds that the lot and storage shed were 
purchased by separate funds by the defendant and are awarded to 
him. 
HOME 
8. The home of the parties is awarded to the defendant 
subject to a lien in the amount of $4,500.00 to be paid by the 
defendant to the plaintiff within 60 days from the date of this 
hearing. 
INCOME TAX LIABILITY 
9. The defendant shall pay the income tax liability to the 
State of Utah or IRS for all years during the marriage. 
PLAINTIFF RESTORED TO FORMER NAME 
10. The plaintiff has requested that she be restored to her 
former name of Koyle and the plaintifffs name shall henceforth be 
and she shall be known as Kathleen S. Koyle. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
11. The plaintiff is awarded $2,000.00 attorneyfs fees and 
judgment shall enter against the defendant in favor of the 
plaintiff in said amount. 
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INTEREST ON SAVINGS ACCOUNT 
12. The court finds that any interest earned on the 
$180,000.00 at First Security Bank in Idaho was marital property, 
but that income was dissipated in living expenses during the time 
the parties were married. 
EXTRA MARITAL AFFAIR 
13. Even though the parties had a long-term relationship, 
the majority of that time was spent as an extra marital rather 
than a marriage relationship. 
ALIMONY 
14. The plaintiff has suffered an economic disadvantage as 
a result of the marriage in that she does not have as good as 
employment as she had before the marriage and during the marriage 
before she quit her employment at the urging of the defendant. 
The plaintiff is entitled to alimony for four years. Alimony is 
twice as long as the length of the marriage. The court will, 
however, give the defendant credit for one year of alimony 
inasmuch as they have been separated and the defendant has been 
paying temporary alimony since September, 1991. The defendant 
shall pay alimony to the plaintiff in the amount of $643.00 
beginning with the month of September, 1992 for a period of one 
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year, or until August of 1993. Thereafter, he shall pay alimony 
in the amount of $600.00 per month for the next two years or up 
until August of 1995. 
DATED this £ / day of &*£&* 
CLIIJI^NHKJDKINS 
DISTRICT JUDGE PRO TEM 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Brent E. Johns 
Attorney for Defendant 
pj/3:smith-k.fnd 
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DECREE OF DIVORCE 
C Pf r>" * 
Jeff R. Thorne of Mann, Hadfield & Thorne #3250 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Zions Bank Building - 98 North Main 
P. O. Box 876 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876 
Telephone: 723-3404 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KAYLENE S. SMITH, 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
ODELL M. SMITH, JR., ] 
Defendant. 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
) Civil No. 910000459DA 
I Judge Clint S. Judkins 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 28th 
day of August, 1992 at the hour of 10:00 o'clock a.m. The 
plaintiff was personally present and was represented by her 
counsel of record, Jeff R. Thorne of the firm of Mann, Hadfield 
and Thorne. The defendant was present and was represented by his 
counsel, Brent E. Johns. The plaintiff introduced her evidence 
and testified in said matter; and the defendant introduced his 
evidence and testified in said matter. The court having entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. DECREE OF DIVORCE 
The plaintiff may have a decree of divorce from the 
defendant, the decree to become final upon signing by the court. 
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2. MARRIAGE PROPERTY 
The only joint property the parties have acquired during the 
time of the marriage is the equity in the home which was 
purchased. The court sets the equity at $9,000.00. The 
defendant shall pay to the plaintiff $4,500.00 within 60 days as 
and for her share of the equity. 
3 AUTOMOBILE 
The 1991 Dodge automobile was purchased with the defendant's 
separate funds. The automobile will be awarded to the defendant. 
4. PERSONAL PROPERTY 
The plaintiff shall be awarded the loveseat, chair and 
vacuum. The defendant shall receive the remainder of the items 
acquired during the marriage. 
5. PERSONAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED PRIOR TO MARRIAGE 
The plaintiff shall be entitled to the items of property 
which were taken to the cabin in Challis, Idaho which were hers 
prior to the time the parties married. Those items of property 
are the table and four chairs, roll-top desk, couch, green 
rocker, square end table, bathroom bench, and green hanging lamp. 
The defendant shall return those items to plaintiff within 10 
days. 
6. MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS 
The defendant shall be awarded the Bible, the carved Bible 
stand, the Revere Ware, the five quart pan with lilac handles, 
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the pressure cooker, the knife block and paring knives, as well 
as any of his cassette tapes which may be in plaintiff's 
possession. All other items of personal property which plaintiff 
has in her possession shall remain hers and shall be her sole and 
separate property. 
7. PLAINTIFF'S UNINSURED MEDICAL EXPENSES 
The defendant shall pay any medical expenses related to 
plaintiff's surgery not covered by insurance, if those expenses 
are incurred within the next six (6) months. 
8. LOT AND STORAGE SHED 
The court finds that the lot and storage shed were purchased 
by separate funds by the defendant and are awarded to him. 
9. HOME 
The home of the parties is awarded to the defendant subject 
to a lien in the amount of $4,500.00 to be paid by the defendant 
to the plaintiff within 60 days from the date of this hearing. 
10. INCOME TAX LIABILITY 
The defendant shall pay the income tax liability to the 
State of Utah or IRS for all years during the marriage. 
11. PLAINTIFF RESTORED TO FORMER NAME 
The plaintiff has requested that she be restored to her 
former name of Koyle and the plaintifffs name shall henceforth be 
and she shall be known as Kathleen S. Koyle. 
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12. ATTORNEY FEES 
The plaintiff is awarded $2,000.00 attorney's fees and 
judgment shall enter against the defendant in favor of the 
plaintiff in said amount. 
13. INTEREST ON SAVINGS ACCOUNT 
The court finds that any interest earned on the $180,000.00 
at First Security Bank in Idaho was marital property, but that 
income was dissipated in living expenses during the time the 
parties were married. 
14. EXTRA MARITAL AFFAIR 
Even though the parties had a long-term relationship, the 
majority of that time was spent as an extra marital rather than a 
marriage relationship. 
15. ALIMONY 
The plaintiff has suffered an economic disadvantage as a 
result of the marriage in that she does not have as good as 
employment as she had before the marriage and during the marriage 
before she quit her employment at the urging of the defendant. 
The plaintiff is entitled to alimony for four years. Alimony is 
twice as long as the length of the marriage. The court will, 
however, give the defendant credit for one year of alimony 
inasmuch as they have been separated and the defendant has been 
paying temporary alimony since September, 1991. The defendant 
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shall pay alimony to the plaintiff in the amount of $643.00 
beginning with the month of September, 1992 for a period of one 
year, or until August of 1993. Thereafter, he shall pay alimony 
in the amount of $600.00 per month for the next two years or up 
until August of 1995. 
16. DIVORCE FINAL UPON SIGNING 
Good cause appearing to the court, the divorce decree shall 
be final upon signing by the court.
 A A 
DATED this \ ^ day of 
CL: 
DISTRI PRO TEM 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Brent E. Johns 
Attorney for Defendant 
pj/3:saiith-k.dec 
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